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LETTER DATED 2 MARCH 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report which was addressed to me on 1 March 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Operations of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994 and paragraph 5 of Council resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995. In those resolutions the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

2. It will be recalled that on 4 August 1994 the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

(a) "To break off political and economic relations with the 'Republika Srpska';

(b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the 'Republika Srpska' (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

(c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the 'Republika Srpska', except food, clothing and medicine."

3. On 19 September, 3 October, 2 November and 5 December 1994, and 5 January and 2 February 1995, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures (S/1994/1074; S/1994/1124; S/1994/1246; S/1994/1372; S/1995/6; S/1995/104). The report dated 2 February 1995 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen:

> "In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces."

In a supplementary note provided to the Security Council on 7 February 1995, the Co-Chairmen stated as follows:

> "The 30-day report from the Co-Chairmen covered a period of only 19 days under resolution 970 (1995) and this is why they did not change the certification wording on this occasion. They are, however, ready to certify that during the last 30-day period from 2 to 31 January based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or national technical means, there were no transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Developments in the past 30 days are dealt with below.

II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

4. The legislation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) closing the border with the Bosnian Serbs continues in force.

5. On 13 February 1995, the Mission Coordinator signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Director of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. M. Kertes, about the control of buses. It was agreed that all buses must be partially checked and that the longer-distance shopping type buses must be thoroughly checked at a minimum level of 20 per cent. It was also agreed that buses based in the "Republika Srpska" with additional fuel tanks will not be allowed to enter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Similarly, buses based in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will not be allowed to enter the "Republika Srpska" with fuel in additional tanks. The Mission Coordinator considers this to be a very tight level of control. The 20 per cent goal of examinations is still to be attained at some border crossing points.

6. The Mission has received from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the following analysis of confiscations by them along the border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period from 4 August 1994 to 31 January 1995.

Goods	At the border crossing points	Elsewhere	Total
Petrol	21.9 tons	23.5 tons	45.4 tons
Diesel	16.4 tons	283.1 tons	399.5 tons
Cigarettes	0.805 tons	43.3 tons	44.1 tons
Construction material	-	161.2 tons	161.2 tons
Wood construction material	-	11.1 cu m	11.1 cu m
Alcohol	326 litres	3 824 litres	4 150 litres
Foodstuff	10 kg	9.5 tons	9.5 tons
Textiles/clothing/footwear	120 kg	9.9 tons	10 tons
Livestock	-	37	37
Other goods	15 tons	36.6 tons	51.6 tons

7. In 138 cases during the above-mentioned period (4 August 1994-31 January 1995), violations resulted in administrative fines or prosecutions. A system has now been established to provide the categories of confiscations and offences on a monthly basis which can be used for comparison purposes. This analysis also includes the Nudo valley incident at the end of December 1994. The Mission Coordinator hopes to obtain these figures separately. Warrants for the arrest of the Nudo valley organizers have been issued.

III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

8. As at 1 March 1995, 189 international Mission personnel were on duty with the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

9. A provisional border crossing point at Nudo valley was activated on a 24-hour basis effective from 7 February. Better weather conditions over the Podgora mountains allowed the remanning of the Sula border crossing point in Sector Bravo on 9 February. The Mission is now covering 21 border crossings 24 hours a day. Of those, 2 are train stations.

10. The Mission headquarters has been reorganized. The senior staff includes two senior advisers, one for political issues who is also deputy to the head of mission and one for customs policy matters who is also special envoy to the Montenegrin Government. The rest of the headquarters personnel is divided between the operations department and the administrative department. Standard operating procedures have been written to provide the Mission monitors with guidelines, ensuring that tasks and duties are dealt with in a uniform, standard and professional manner.

11. The UHF radio network installation has been completed in the area of operations of sectors Belgrade and Alpha. Work is under way in the remaining sectors.

A. Auditing of the Mission's accounts

12. Appendix I to the present report contains a summary of the finances made available to the Mission up to 28 February 1995. The accounts of the Mission are currently being audited by an independent accounting firm. The initial audit will cover the period from 17 September 1994 until 9 January 1995 and the results will be made known.

B. Additional observers needed by the Mission

13. The approved budget of the Mission for the period from 1 December 1994 to 31 May 1995 is US$ 3.1 million, based on 170 observers, 85 interpreters and 85 vehicles. Contributions received to date are only US$ 1.1 million. Based on previous patterns, there are uncertainties about payment from some countries, estimated at $0.7 million, leaving the Mission with an estimated expected amount of $1.3 million until the end of May. With the target of 225 observers, the subsequent requirement for additional funding for the period is estimated at $2,245,000, leaving the Mission with an under-funding of $945,000 for the next three months, assuming that expected payments are actually made, and on time.

14. Unless the assessed funds arrive shortly, particularly from the main contributors, the Mission may well have to cease operation and terminate within the month. Without the approval and receipt of the needed additional funding of $945,000, it will not be able to sustain the operation until the end of May.

15. The Mission strength as of the date of this report is 189 international observers. It is expected that this number will increase to approximately 225, including the impending arrival of some 20 observers from the United States, 5 from the Russian Federation and 2 from the United Kingdom. Provided that these members join the Mission, it will be able to cope with its current tasks and duties. However, even with these additions unusually heavy demands will still be made on Mission personnel, who are currently working an average of 12 hours daily, 6 to 7 days a week.

16. Having also evaluated staffing levels required to meet its obligations, the Mission would require an additional 25 observers, bringing the total number of monitors to 250 with a corresponding increase in the number of interpreters and vehicles. The incremental cost of adding these additional members is estimated at $200,000 for a three-month period.

17. The following is a table of funding requirements until 31 May 1995:

		United States dollars
-	Operating funds from March to May: $500,000 x 3 months	1 500 000
-	Termination costs	70 000
-	Improvement of border control points working conditions from caravans to portacabins	200 000
-	Payment of outstanding obligations	250 000
-	Cost of pledged staffing: 190 to 225 monitors	225 000
	Total funds required, March-May	2 245 000
	Current funding of the Mission: (not including voluntary start-up contributions)	
	Assessed contributions	3 130 000
Less:	Contingencies for non/late payment of assessed contributors a/	(700 000)
	Assessed contributions received	(1 130 000)
	Expected payment of assessments until the end of May	1 300 000
	Supplementary funds required	945 000
Plus:	Funds required to increase staffing from 225 to 250	200 000
Total supplementary funds required from participating States		1 145 000

a/ Certain contributing States have developed a pattern of non-payment or late payment of assessed contributions.

A summary showing the current status of contributions is presented in appendix II to the present report.

C. Question of an aerial component for the Mission

18. As will be related in section VII below, alleged helicopter incidents between 1 and 4 February have attracted a great deal of publicity. This raises the issue of whether the Mission should be provided with an aerial component.

19. Radar coverage of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the "Republika Srpska" from Surcin extends as far as the Montenegrin border under optimum conditions. The ability to detect

helicopters is dependent upon several factors: height and size of target, weather returns, terrain and the tuning and power of the radar equipment.

20. In addition to the acceptance by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to permit unimpeded access for United Nations military observers (UNMOs) to existing facilities (which would be in the interest of the desire of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to confirm their total closure of the "Republika Srpska" border), further means could be employed to achieve increased certainty of coverage:

- By employment of a NATO airborne sensor, either fixed-wing or helicopter;

- Through the use of mobile radar facilities placed at optimum positions along the border.

21. The Mission's understanding is that AWACS are primarily tasked to watch for fixed-wing violations, the lower detection threshold of their radar being set above that of a slow-moving helicopter. This is to avoid the clutter of additional targets that fast-moving road vehicles would produce.

22. Should an airborne watch be preferred, then there are a number of aircraft besides AWACS that could be considered. Specialist advice would need to be sought to determine how this can be achieved.

23. Alternatively, mobile low-altitude radar systems could be employed. This is sophisticated, complex equipment, which the Mission does not have the technical means to operate and support. A number of radars would be required to cover the length of the border. As the latter is in a predominantly mountainous region, radars would have to be accurately sited to ensure total coverage of the numerous valleys and ridges that exist. Each unit would likely consist of a radar head, power plant, control room communications, accommodation and a staffing by up to 50 technicians, supported by an extensive logistical and administrative structure.

24. In the opinion of the Mission, the cost of a mobile radar operation, in terms of both manpower and equipment would be high and the Mission Coordinator therefore recommended to the Co-Chairmen that the UNMO system already in place - with the specific assurances from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of unhindered access to the radar screens - should continue verification of Security Council resolution 781 (1992).

25. In the absence of any evidence of helicopters flying from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Co-Chairmen do not recommend that scarce resources for the Mission be expended for radar equipment to monitor helicopter flights but instead that Governments should meet their financial obligations and provide the resources needed to allow the number of Mission observers to rise to 250 with increased mobile patrolling, and that the UNMO system already in place should continue its monitoring of the airspace.

IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE MISSION

26. The Mission continues to enjoy full freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

27. On 3 February, threats were heard by the Chief of Police at Sremska Raca against Mission observers. The threats were coming from the "Republika Srpska" side. In the evening the police were seen to be carrying rifles and wearing flack jackets and helmets. Also, Sector Alpha reported that the situation at Badovinci was tense during the first week of February and the locals were becoming angry with the customs, police and Mission observers. Tensions subsided later, but Mission staff are alert for any recurrence.

28. A shooting incident occurred on 14 February in the north of Section Charlie in Montenegro. Upon return from a foot patrol near the Bosnian border, the personnel went into their vehicle and proceeded to return to Pluzine along the same unimproved dirt road it had used to reach its dismount point. After driving 500 metres, the vehicle approached a number of large rocks which ineffectively blocked the road. The observers got out of their vehicle and as they began to move the rocks a weapon report rang out. The next report was preceded by the sound of an impact within metres of the patrol's general location and was considered a good indication that the rifle fire was purposely aimed in the direction of the patrol. During the four minutes required to hastily move the rocks, five rifle reports were heard. An unknown individual pointing a hunting rifle at the patrol was spotted. All Mission personnel and equipment evacuated the area without damage or injury and proceeded to the Pluzine police station to inform the local authorities. It is the patrol's general impression that the incident was not designed to inflict physical harm on Mission members even though the circumstances were characteristic of an ambush.

29. On 15 February, the Mission Coordinator's Special Envoy (a member of the patrol involved in the shooting incident) and two other members of the patrol were invited to meet the Interior Minister of Montenegro. The Deputy Interior Minister and the Chief of the Niksić Police, together with his deputy, were also present. The shooting incident was discussed in some detail: a 17-year-old youth had been arrested. He had admitted firing in the area at the time and the place of the incident, but stated that he was not aware of the patrol's presence and that Mission involvement was purely an accident. He will be charged with possessing a firearm under age and without a licence, and for firing in an area likely to endanger life. His elder brother, who legally owns the gun, may also face prosecution. The Mission Coordinator has passed his commendation to the Montenegrin authorities for their prompt and effective action in this matter.

V. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

30. In the assessment of the Mission Coordinator, the cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be satisfactory.

31. On 6 February 1995, the Mission Coordinator, together with his Senior Political Advisor, Special Envoy and Press Officer, met with the President of Montenegro, Mr. Bulatović; the Commander of the Second Army, General Babić; and the Commander of the Herzeg Novi Military District, Admiral Zeć. They all reaffirmed their commitment to continue the high level of cooperation with the Mission and the effective closure of the border between Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 22 February 1995, the Mission Coordinator paid a courtesy call on President Milošević.

32. In the assessment of the Mission Coordinator, at most border crossing points, the level of customs inspection of vehicles is good. Customs officials are confiscating goods which have not been declared prior to the vehicles being examined and are turning away vehicles trying to cross the border several times per day. The amount of fuel confiscated seems to be increasing. Customs at Sremska Raca has informed the Mission that, on average, contraband valued at DM 60,000 is seized at the border crossing point each week. This excludes the value of any fuel confiscated.

VI. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

33. The operating principle of the Mission is to base itself on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator has maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide it with information relevant to its mandate.

34. The Mission Coordinator has received information from different sources that there might be an underwater oil pipeline across the Drina river. No exact location of this possible pipeline has been given. Mission mobile patrols have been searching for any sign of a pipeline on the banks of the Drina, but no signs of it have been discovered.

VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

35. The Mission now covers 21 major crossings 24 hours a day. Appendix III to the present report contains a comprehensive and updated list of border crossings between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A. No-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina

36. The alleged helicopter incidents between 1 and 4 February, in particular the reported sightings of 15 to 20 helicopters near Srebrenica on 3 February, have been thoroughly investigated. There has been no confirmation of any helicopters crossing the border either from NATO or national Governments during this period, nor from UNMOs in a position to monitor the airspace through their presence in the radar control room at Surcin airport, Belgrade. Between 2 and 15 February, the UNMOs were denied the facility to watch over a local radar operator but were not banned from the radar room itself. When the Co-Chairmen,

Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, met President Milošević in Belgrade on 15 February to discuss wider questions, they asked him to make more information available for the days of the alleged helicopter sightings and on the capabilities of the radar at Surcin. That same afternoon they were informed that the Chief UNMO in Belgrade had been called in to review the tapes.

37. The Mission Coordinator subsequently reported to the Co-Chairmen that after reviewing the radar tapes for the days in question, the UNMOs had found nothing except one approved MEDEVAC flight which was observed by a Mission team at Ljubovica. Nine reports from the Srebrenica area from the period from 1 to 4 February were evaluated. The radar tapes were evaluated 10 minutes before and 10 minutes after each actual report. The review was carried out by UNMO air traffic controllers in good cooperation with, and support from, the local representatives of the Surcin airport authorities and the Yugoslav Air Force liaison officer. Of the nine reports only the third report showed a short track which covered an approved MEDEVAC helicopter flight from Batajnica to Pale. The observers of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia at Ljubovica observed a helicopter at the expected travel time, and the timings also fit in with the ground operations done at Srebrenica. The conclusion was therefore that the radar track did not indicate a border-crossing violation and the flight was not a ground-observed violation.

38. In meetings with the Mission Coordinator, on 8 and 13 February, Mr. Kertes, the Head of the Customs Authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), categorically denied involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in any of the alleged helicopter flights near Srebrenica. He also vigorously rejected suggestions that "Republika Srpska" helicopters could have crossed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), stating that instructions had been given to shoot down any "Republika Srpska" helicopter that might try to cross the border. The Mission also held meetings on Tuesday, 14 February, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) at Belgrade, and on 15 February a mission operations officer was in attendance at a meeting between the representatives of UNPROFOR and air traffic control personnel at Surcin. The Coordinator of the Mission has checked repeatedly with Mission monitors along the border in the most likely areas of possible crossing and none has either seen or heard any helicopters crossing the border during that period. The Coordinator of the Mission has double-checked with heads of Mission sectors Alpha and Bajina Basta, both of whom reaffirmed that none of their observers saw or heard any helicopters near to or crossing the border between Serbia and the "Republika Srpska" during the dates or times in question. On 17 February, the Mission Coordinator met with the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Bjelica, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Kovacević and the Commander of the First Army, General Ojdanić. They all categorically denied any involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in any of the flights near Srebrenica. On 22 February, President Milošević also assured the Mission Coordinator that no helicopters from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were involved.

39. At the meeting with the Mission Coordinator, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) requested that the results of the investigations into the alleged helicopter incidents should be made known at the

highest level where the accusations against them were originally made. They also requested assistance from UNPROFOR and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to unlock blocked overseas accounts in order to enable procurement of radar equipment spare parts.

40. It will be recalled that, following negotiations between the then Co-Chairmen, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and the then Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and in particular President Cosić and Prime Minister Panić, an agreement was signed on 2 November 1992 between General Zivota Panić, CGS JA, and Lt. General Satish Nambiar, Force Commander UNPROFOR, concerning access to the airfields at Surcin and Batajnica (Belgrade), Podgorica (Montenegro), Pristina (Kosovo) and Kraljevo (now closed). It also included access to Nis, Ponikve (10 kilometres south-east of Bajina Basta) and Berane (formerly Ivangrad, in Montenegro). Currently, UNMO controllers are based at Surcin (Belgrade) whilst airfield monitors are deployed at the Batajnica, Podgorica, Ponikve and Pristina airfields.

41. When NATO began to police the no-fly zone around March 1993, they tried to stop helicopter flights as well as the flying of fixed-wing aircraft. Whereas under the voluntary agreement fixed-wing flying stopped, helicopter flying began to build up and NATO aircraft, despite taking action to force down some helicopters, soon found that helicopter violations continued regardless of their actions. There have been in total 3,936 violations since April 1992. The violations are broken down as follows: 14 per cent for the Croats, 33 per cent for the Bosnians, 46 per cent for the Serbs and 7 per cent unknown.

42. At the meeting on 15 February between the air traffic control authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), representatives from UNPROFOR and the Mission, full access for the UNMOs was restored with an improvement in availability of facilities being assured. The Mission Coordinator has reported that at that meeting it was confirmed by the civil aviation authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that UNMOs would be assured full and unimpeded admission to the ATC radar room at Surcin airport and the sole use of a free radar scope. The voice and radar tapes would also be made available for analysis by the UNMOs. In fact, the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) requested that UNMOs should review the tapes for the whole period to avoid any further accusations or suspicions.

43. From the Mission's point of view, with the lack of any confirmation, or of visual or other evidence, it has concluded that there is no evidence that the helicopters sighted near Srebrenica came from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In its resolution 781 (1992), the Security Council gives the mandate for UNPROFOR to monitor compliance of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), this is done by UNMOs consisting of 5 controllers and 16 airfield monitors tasked to report on violations of the no-fly zone.

B. Other issues

44. On 1 February, the ferry at Jamena was loaded on trucks parked on the "Republika Srpska" side of the river. The motor boat has also been removed. The Colonel in charge of the military in the vicinity of Jamena and Sremska Raca said that the Yugoslav Army is increasing the number and size of its patrols in the area. The military accompanied the Mission's mobile observer team in the area on 4 February in full-body armour and with rifles - which had not been done hitherto.

45. Near Jamena a Yugoslav Army patrol in mid-February caught two smugglers, with 43 boxes of cigarettes and DM 8,000. One smuggler managed to escape. All the goods were confiscated. In order to suppress smuggling, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) occasionally saturate areas along the Drina with Yugoslav Army ambushes, irregular guard posts and special police operations.

46. At Sremska Raca, on 9 February, a truck had 100,000 cigarettes in a concealed container. The cigarettes and the truck were confiscated and taken to Novi Sad for inspection. On 10 February, two trucks approached the crossing point at considerable speed, and as the barrier was up, they passed straight through. The assessment of the Mission observers was that the trucks were waiting for the right moment as there were only a few vehicles at the crossing point. Customs officials gave conflicting reasons for the incident. On 11 February, a military truck was allowed to cross without being checked. On 27 February, two buses, each containing about 50 young men, crossed the border into Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was explained that they were young soldiers going on holiday following their basic training. No obvious military equipment or clothing was seen on the buses. Both buses had Vukovar plates.

47. At Badovinci, on 11 February, a Bosnian Serb police officer in uniform and with a side-arm was allowed to cross the border. On the same day, another violation occurred when a van full of stationery was allowed to cross into the "Republika Srpska".

48. At Trbusnica, on 26 February, a car full of goods was allowed to cross the border. The customs officials' justification for this was that the goods were for the Army. This incident has been reported to the Head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for an explanation.

49. On 11 February, an incident occurred at the Sastavci crossing, when two cars crossed the border into the "Republika Srpska" using the bypass road. The cars appeared at the Sastavci border crossing point but were rejected for arriving too late at the crossing point which had already closed. The Mission team noticed the cars when they returned to the bypass road and crossed into the "Republika Srpska". The local police and the Mission teams jointly investigated the matter. Tracks were discovered on the bypass road indicating that it had been used by several cars. As a result two official requests were made: (a) that the bypass be effectively closed; and (b) that the owners of the vehicles be prosecuted.

50. At Metaljka, on 16 February, some excessive foodstuffs were stopped from crossing the border. Observers witnessed some of these goods re-entering Bosnia via a small bypass track which is usable only for pedestrians. The goods were loaded onto vehicles on the other side of the border.

51. A helicopter (Mi-8) with Red Cross insignia flew across the border from Montenegro to Bosnia along the Drina valley at Scepan Polje on 21 February at 1030 hours. The flight had not been authorized by the United Nations. The Yugoslav Army has been unable to confirm the mission status (authorized or unauthorized) of the helicopter sighting. During the Mission Coordinator's meeting on 28 February with Mr. Kertes, he informed the Mission Coordinator that the Montenegrin police had confirmed the flight of a helicopter, but insisted that it had only taken place along the border and had not crossed into Bosnia.

52. At Vracenovici, a van passed through the border crossing point after its closing, on 20 February, at 2055 hours. It was not checked and the Mission observers estimate that it was carrying 10 large tyres.

53. The Mission Coordinator has been informed by UNPROFOR Belgrade of a number of air crossings of the border that have taken place between 21 and 27 February 1995. Since being allowed full and unimpeded access to the radar room at Surcin, UNMO controllers have detected several slow-moving contacts which appear to have crossed the border between Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). These contacts have been tracked travelling only from west to east. Precise details on these reports have been submitted by UNPROFOR through their chain of command. The UNMO controller had access to the raw radar of the military scope at all times. At the time the weather was good and the ground speed of the contacts was between 45 and 95 knots. Crossings were made at various points between Bijeljina and Priboj during the day and at night. None of these crossings has been visually witnessed by Mission members. The Mission is following up these reports.

54. At the Vilusi border crossing point, on 8 February, the police confiscated three hand grenades, over 200 rounds of small-arms ammunition, a knife and miscellaneous military equipment from a car. On 9 February, at the Vilusi bypass, the Mission mobile patrol encountered a car leaving the barrier in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On the "Republika Srpska" side of the barrier, the patrol observed two men loading a car with about 200 litres of fuel and about 500 cartons of cigarettes. The patrol radioed for police assistance, but the smugglers had left before the police arrived. The Mission mobile patrol gave the identification of the vehicles to the police.

55. There are signs that the so-called Vilusi bypass is frequently used by smugglers. Contraband is carried around the barrier on the road. On 16 February, a Mission mobile patrol noticed a smuggler in the vicinity of the bypass. The observer suggested that the smuggler turn himself in to the police at the border crossing point, which he did. His goods were confiscated and, according to the police, he was arrested. A second barrier closer to the main road has been built to prevent continued smuggling activities. Customs teams and police have been patrolling in the area.

56. In the Nudo valley, the police have received instructions to man the Nudo crossing, and a customs officer arrived at Nudo on 3 February. The Mission Coordinator sent a letter to the Second Army Commander, General Babić, on 30 January, proposing that a "provisional" checkpoint be established on the Nudo valley road. In addition, the Mission Coordinator proposed that a movable barrier be installed on the track leading south from the Nudo valley and that some additional barricades be constructed on the tracks in the border area to the north of Vilusi, as soon as the weather conditions permitted.

57. On 7 February, a provisional crossing point was established in the Nudo valley with the customs, the police and the Mission observers maintaining a 24-hour presence. The checkpoint can be used only by people living in the Nudo valley. The main border crossing point for traffic towards Trebinje in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains at Vilusi. Under this arrangement, the Mission Coordinator made it clear that abuse of the checkpoint for smuggling purposes would automatically require re-establishment of a permanent barricade, should the Mission conclude that this is the only effective way to ensure compliance with the Government's border closure policy.

58. To enhance the closure of the Montenegrin border, the military has built six additional barricades on tracks north of Vracenovici and blocked one more track south of Krstać.

59. On 3 February, the Mission Coordinator, together with his Senior Political Advisor, met the Head of the Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. M. Kertes. They discussed requirements contained within Security Council resolution 970 (1995), paragraph 3, and especially the contents of the phrase "international humanitarian agencies". At the same time the Memorandum on Definitions of Humanitarian Aid, signed by Mr. Kertes and Mr. Pellnas on 4 November 1994 (S/1994/1372, appendix), was discussed. No changes in the prevailing practices were made.

60. During the 30 days, from 14 January to 14 February 1995, Sector Belgrade sealed a total of 925 trucks with a total weight of 19,109 metric tons. The average number of trucks sealed, each 30 days, in the first 100 days was 1,185, with a weight of 15,995 metric tons. During the period from 14 January to 14 February, there were fewer loads but with increased tonnage. Around 70 per cent of the trucks sealed belong to the Yugoslav Red Cross, whose trucks account for around 80 per cent of the total tonnage.

61. At several border crossing points during the last week of February, many vehicles with 4 to 6 sacks of fertilizer were crossing the border to Bosnia. According to information from the local customs authorities, fertilizer suppliers in Badovinci are paying anyone who is willing to deliver any number of sacks of fertilizers to their shops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A great number of vehicles have been denied crossing for the second time in a day. Excess amounts of fertilizer, beer and fuel continue to be the main violations reported.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

62. In the light of the foregoing developments during the past 30 days, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, whether the airborne reconnaissance system of NATO or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that during the past 30 days no transshipments were detected by the Mission across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

IX. FUNDING

63. The Co-Chairmen wish to draw particular attention to the fact that the resources available for the Mission have been exhausted and that unless contributions outstanding are received urgently the Co-Chairmen will have no alternative but to wind down the Mission.

Appendix I

Financial status as at 28 February 1995

Contributions		United States dollars
1.1	Voluntary contributions	735 988.08 a/
1.2	Assessed contributions	1 153 975.83
	Total	1 889 963.91

Statement of account with Swiss bank corporations

2.1	Funds transferred to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Belgrade	1 872 186.55
2.2	Expenses paid by bank on behalf of the Mission	1 758.27
2.3	Banking charges	31.04
2.4	Balance of funds with bank	15 988.05
	Total	1 889 963.91

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a/ Voluntary contributions totalled $800,000. At the start of the Mission, an amount of $64,011.92 was taken directly to Belgrade without passing through the bank account of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Appendix II

Status of assessments as at 28 February 1995

(United States dollars)

Contributing States	Percentage share	Proportionate share of cost	Contributions received	Outstanding balance	Credit against assessment
Albania	0.01	313.00	0.00	313.00	
Austria	0.75	23 487.00	23 458.86	28.14	
Belgium	1.53	47 914.00	47 913.00	1.00	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.04	1 253.00	0.00	1 253.00	
Bulgaria	0.13	4 071.00	0.00	4 071.00	
Canada	3.11	97 394.00	0.00	97 394.00	
China	0.77	24 114.00	24 113.00	1.00	
Croatia	0.13	4 071.00	0.00	4 071.00	
Denmark	0.94	29 437.00	0.00	29 437.00	
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)	0.14	4 384.00	0.00	4 384.00	
France	8.68	271 825.00	271 825.00	0.00	
Germany	12.92	404 606.00	404 606.00	0.00	
Greece	0.51	15 971.00	15 971.00	0.00	
Hungary	0.18	5 637.00	0.00	5 637.00	
Ireland	0.26	8 142.00	8 143.00	(1.00)	
Italy	6.21	194 474.00	0.00	194 474.00	
Japan	12.45	389 887.00	0.00	389 887.00	
Luxembourg	0.09	2 818.00	0.00	2 818.00	
Netherlands	2.17	67 956.00	67 957.00	(1.00)	
Norway	0.55	17 224.00	17 224.00	0.00	
Portugal	0.29	9 082.00	9 082.00	0.00	
Romania	0.17	5 324.00	0.00	5 324.00	
Russian Federation	6.71	210 132.00	0.00	210 132.00	
Saudi Arabia	0.96	30 064.00	0.00	30 064.00	
Senegal	0.01	313.00	0.00	313.00	
Slovakia	0.13	4 071.00	0.00	4 071.00	
Slovenia	0.09	2 818.00	0.00	2 818.00	
Spain	2.87	89 878.00	0.00	89 878.00	
Sweden	1.11	34 761.00	0.00	34 761.00	
Switzerland	1.16	36 327.00	36 327.00	0.00	
Turkey	0.27	8 455.00	0.00	8 455.00	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7.26	227 356.00	227 355.97	0.03	
United States of America	25.00	782 906.00	0.00	782 906.00	
Organization of the Islamic Conference	2.40	75 159.00	0.00	75 159.00	
TOTALS	100.00	3 131 624.00	1 153 975.83	1 977 648.17	

Note: The table reflects the current status of contributions for the period from 1 December 1994 to 31 May 1995. It does not include voluntary start-up contributions.

Appendix III

Border points in the Mission, updated as at 1 March 1995

BCP = BORDER CROSSING POINT, MANNED AND CONTROLLED BY ICFY AND THE FRY AUTHORITIES
(19 + 2 TRAIN STATIONS)

CCP = CONTROLLED CROSSING POINT, MANNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE FRY AUTHORITIES
(13)

UCP = UNCONTROLLED (UNMANNED / USED OR POTENTIAL) CROSSING POINT
(71)

(JA = THE YUGOSLAV ARMY'S MILITARY COMPOUNDS FROM WHERE THEY PATROL THE CCPs)
(9)

HOW TO READ :

BCP BE 01 = BORDER CROSSING POINT BELGRADE 01

CCP A 08 = CONTROLLED CROSSING POINT ALPHA 08

UCP BB 01 = UNCONTROLLED CROSSING POINT BAJINA BASTA 01

AND SO ON.

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BELGRADE

BCP BE 01	**JAMENA (CQ 487 711)**	**24 HOURS**
	MILITARY FERRY (NOT USED)	1 CARAVAN
BCP BE 02	**SREMSKA RACA (CQ 656 743)**	**24 HOURS**
	BRIDGE, OPEN 24 HOURS	2 CARAVANS

(RAILWAY CLOSED), UNHCR/ICRC/YRC — CAPSAT TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR ALPHA

BCP A 04 **BADOVINCI (CQ 687 599)**
BRIDGE, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 — **24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS+ POLICE

CCP A 04A SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 715 784)

CCP A 04B SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 718 791)

CCP A 04 C BALATUN (CQ 716 683)
CLOSED - DISUSED FERRY

CCP A 04D (CQ 656 640) — SMUGGLING INCIDENT FOR EX. 28 FEB

CCP A 05 LESNICA (CQ 648 467)
CLOSED - DISUSED FERRY

CCP A 05A SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 687 556)

CCP A 05B SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 680 550)

CCP A 05C SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 678 536)
WITH THE ACCESS TO SECONDARY CREEK FROM THE RIVER

BCP A 06 **TRBUSNICA (CQ 556 338)**
BRIDGE, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 — **24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS

UCP A 06A SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 616 445)

CCP A 06B SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 592 409)

CCP A 06C DISUSED FERRY (CQ 567 391)
WITH CABLE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA

UCP A 06D SMALL BOAT CROSSING (CQ 563 362)

CCP A 07 BANJA KOVILJACA (CQ 610 306)
CLOSED - DISUSED FERRY

UCP A 07A GORNJA KOVILJACA (CQ 519 271)
SMALL BOAT CROSSING

CCP A 08 **DONJA BOBNA (CQ 526 210)**
CLOSED RAILWAY, SEALED, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

BCP A 09 **MALI ZVORNIK (CQ 507 187)**
BRIDGE, OPEN 0600-1900, ONLY UNHCR — **24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ CUSTOMS

CCP A 10 STARI MOST ZVORNIK (CQ 493 145)
BRIDGE FOR PEDESTRIANS AND EMERGENCY VEHICLES, OPEN 0600-1900
CONTROLLED BY POLICE 24 HRS

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR ALPHA CONT'D

CCP A 11 DAM ZVORNIK (CQ 491 145)
BRIDGE FOR PEDESTRIANS, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

UCP A11A (CQ 545 654)

UCP A11B (CQ 665 636)

BCP A 12 LJUBOVIJA (CQ 688 960)
BRIDGE, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900

24 HOURS
2 CARAVANS
CAPSAT
TELEPHONE/
CUSTOMS

CCP A 12A GRAVEL BEACH (CP 778 898)
WITH 2 OBSERVED BOATS

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BAJINA BASTA

UCP BB 00A	VITINOVAC (CP 787 859) 25 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 00B	GORNJA TRESNICA (CP 781 871) 22 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 01	FAKOVICI (CP 812 821) 15 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	4 PONTOONS RESTORED ON THE RIVER BANK FRY SIDE
UCP BB 01A	PAUNICE (CP 844 811) 12 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 02	KOD KAMENA (CP 863 796) 9,5 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 03	OKLETAC OLD (CP 865 802) 9 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 03A	GAZOM (CP 865 883) 7,7 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 04	OKLETAC NEW (CP 867 810) 7,5 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 04A	VRANJKOVINA (CP 882 789) 4 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 04B	BANDERA (CP 881 788) 3,5 KM N OF ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 05	OVCINJA (CP 895 779) 1 KM N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 05A	OVCINJA (CP 894 778) N OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 05B	ROGACICA (CP 893 774) ROGACICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 06	DONJA PETRICA (CP 895 741) 2 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	USED ALMOST DAILY
UCP BB 07	PETRICA (CP 896 748) 3 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 08	CRIVICA DONJA (CP 878 741) 5 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
UCP BB 09	CRIVICA GORNJA (CP 867 733) 7 KM S OF ROGACICA, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	

BCP BB 10	**SKELANI (831 703)** BRIDGE, NO BUSES AND LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900	**24 HOURS** 1 CARAVAN 1 WOODEN CABIN TELEPHONE
UCP BB 10A	BESEROVINA (CP 767 686) 7 KM FROM SKELANI, WIRE ACROSS THE RIVER DRINA	
CCP BB 10B	**PERUCAC DAM (CP 723 692)** 12 KM W OF SKELANI, DAM, PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE, OPEN 0600-1900 CONTROLLED BY POLICE (24HRS) AND CUSTOMS	

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BAJINA BASTA CONT'D

UCP BB 10C	WATERMILL RUIN (CP 632 654) 5,5, KM WSW OF RASISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10CA	VELIKI STOLAC (CP 623 646) HUGE TREE ACROSS THE DIRT ROAD	
UCP BB 10D	CAPTAINS WATER (CP 636 632) 6,4 KM SW OF RASISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10E	TRENCH VIEW (CP 660 614) 7,3 KM SSW OF RASISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10F	PECENICE (CP 666 588) 3 KM W OF JEZDICI, TRACK	
UCP BB 10G	RAJACI (CP 669 584) 3 KM SW OF JEZDICI, TRACK	
UCP BB 10H	BOLISTE (CP 674 576) 4 KM SSW OF JEZDICI, TRACK	
UCP BB 10I	BOLISTE STN (CP 674 570) 1 KM S OF BOLISTE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10J	BARE (CP 682 558) BARE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10K	RIJEVICE (CP 692 550) RIJEVICE, TRACK	
UCP BB 10L	TETREBICA (CP 705 525) TETREBICA, TRACK	
UCP BB 10LA	ZAGVOZNICA (CP 736 498) TRACK	
UCP BB 10LB	LIPA (CP 737 490) TRACK	
UCP BB 10M	SADDLE (CP 760 475) 1 KM NW OF KOTROMAN, TRACK	
BCB BB 11	**KOTROMAN (CP 769 468)** MAIN ROAD, ONLY UNHCR, OPEN 0600-1900	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS TELEPHONE/ POLICE
UCP BB 12	PANJAK (CP778 446) 3 KM SE OF KOTROMAN, TRACK	
UCP BB 13	COLES TUNNEL (CP 806 398) 2 KM W OF JABLANICA, RAILWAY	
TRAIN STN	**UZICE** (RAIL TEAM - SEALING OF TRAINS)	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT TELEPHONE
TRAIN STN	**PRIBOJ** (RAIL TEAM - SEALING OF TRAINS)	**24 HOURS** 1 CONTAINER CAPSAT TELEPHONE

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BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BRAVO

CCP B 14A **RIVER FORD (CP 788 330)**
PEDESTRIAN WIRE BRIDGE, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

BCP B 15 **RACA (FAP BRIDGE) (CP 783 321)** **24 HOURS**
BIG CONCRETE BRIDGE, PEDESTRIANS, 24 HRS 2 CARAVANS

UCP B 15A **FOOT BRIDGE (CP 786 298)**
1 KM SOUTH OF FAB BRIDGE (PEDESTRIANS)

CCP B 15B **STONE BRIDGE (CP 785 294)**
PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE, CONTROLLED BY MILITARY 24 HRS

BCP B 16 **UVAC (CP 783 288)** **24 HOURS**
BRIDGE/SURFACE ROAD 2 CARAVANS
NO LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 TELEPHONE/
CUSTOMS

UCP B 16A **RAILWAY BRIDGE (CP 783 287)**
100 M SOUTH OF B 16

CCP B 16B **HOSPITAL CHECKPOINT (CP 800 270)**
SURFACE ROAD, OPEN 0600-1900, CONTROLLED BY POLICE 24 HRS

BCP B 17 **SASTAVCI (CP 728 260)** **24 HOURS**
SURFACE ROAD, NO LORRIES 1 CONTAINER
OPEN 0600-1900 CAPSAT

UCP B 17A **CERALJE (CP 414 284)**
TRACK

BCP B 18 **METALJKA (CP 497 213)** **24 HOURS**
SURFACE ROAD, NO LORRIES 2 CARAVANS
OPEN 0600-1900 1 CONTAINER
CAPSAT

UCP B 18A **RUJEVICA (CP 361 168)**
TRACK

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR BRAVO CONT'D

BCP B 19	**SULA (CP 414 069)** SURFACE ROAD, NO LORRIES. OPEN 0600-1900 MANNED BY POLICE 24 HRS	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT
UCP B 29	SLATINA / SLATINA ROAD (CN 452 939 / 428 934) TRACK	

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR CHARLIE

UCP C 00	LISICA DO (CP 303 028) BLOWN BRIDGE	NO CROSSING POSSIBLE
(JA 01	POLJE CRKVICKO (CN 288 993) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS)	
BCP C 01	SCEPAN POLJE (CP 254 018) POLICE AND CUSTOMS, NO LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900,LOCKED - SEALED 1900-0600 CHAIN BARRIER	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT
(JA 02	MRATINJE (CN 218 928) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STONE WALL, ACTIVE CONTROL OF ALL TRAFFIC)	
CCP C 01A	MRATINJE (CN 216 935) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT NO OBSTACLES	MANNED 24 HRS
UCP C 01B	STUBICA I (CN 147 827) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	(UNOBSERVED SINCE DEC DUE TO SNOW)
CCP C 01C	STUBICA II (CN 148 823) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT WOODEN GATE	MANNED 24 HRS
(JA 03	STABNA (CN 175 814) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STONE WALL , ACTIVE CONTROL OF ALL TRAFFIC)	
BCP C 02	KRSTAC (4 KM NE OF KRSTAC) (CN 097 667) POLICE AND CUSTOMS, NO LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900 MONTENEGRIN VILLAGES BEYOND METAL SAW HORSES	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS
(JA 04	KRSTAC (CN 122 639) JA MILITARY COMPOUND STEEL POLE ON THE ROAD)	MANNED 24 HRS
CCP C 03	G. CRKVICE (BN 973 655) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT STONE WALL, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	MANNED 24 HRS
(JA 05	CRKVICE (BN 996 589) JA MILITARY COMPOUND ACTIVE TRAFFIC CONTROL)	
UCP C 04	KOVACI (BN 984 599) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY

UCP C 04B	BECKA PEC I (BN 962 555) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR CHARLIE CONT'D

UCP C 04C	BECKA PEC II (BN 961 563) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 04D	VRBICA (BN 948 539) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 04E	VUCI DO I (BN 956 525) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 04F	VUCI DO II (BN 957 514) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
(JA 06	**PILATOVCI (BN967 480) JA MILITARY COMPOUND** OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	
UCP C 06	KORAVLJICA (BN 936 478) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
UCP C 07	VIDINE (BN 935 437) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
BCP C 08	**VRACENOVICI (BN 944 468)** POLICE AND CUSTOMS, NO LORRIES OPEN 0600-1900 METAL SAW HORSES	**24 HOURS** 2 CARAVANS
(JA 07	**KLJAKOVICA (BN 942 410) JA MILITARY COMPOUND** OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	
CCP C 09	**KLJAKOVICA I (BN 942 410) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT** STONE WALL, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS HEADING WEST	**MANNED 24 HRS**
CCP C 09A	**KLJAKOVICA II (BN 942 410) JA MILITARY CHECKPOINT** STEEL POLE GATE, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS HEADING NORTH	**MANNED 24 HRS**
UCP C 09B	PETROVICI (BN 942 388) STONE WALL	PATROLLED DAILY
CCP C 09C	**RIVER ROAD (OLD RAILWAY ROAD) (BN 938 365)** STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	**MANNED 24 HRS**
UCP C 10	PARESKI DO (BN 966 343) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	PATROLLED DAILY
BCP C 11	**VILUSI (or ILIJINO BRDO) (CN 006 318)** POLICE AND CUSTOMS, OPEN 24 HOURS METAL SAW HORSES, UNHCR/ICRC/YRC	**24 HOURS** 1 CARAVAN

BCPs, CCPs AND UCPs IN SECTOR CHARLIE CONT'D

UCP C 11A	FIRST VILUSI BY-PASS (CN 011 329) TWO STONE WALLS, POLICE PATROL CO-OPERATIVE PATROLS	
UCP C 11B	SECOND VILUSI BY-PASS (CN 010 328) STEEL POLE GATE (LOCKED AND SEALED) POLICE AND ICFY OBSERVE AND PATROL	
BCP C 12	NUDO (BN 989 298) (PROVISIONAL BCP) POLICE AND CUSTOMS, ONLY FOR THE LOCALS, NO LORRIES, OPEN 0530-1930 METAL SAW HORSES	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS
(JA 08	NUDO (CN 007 278) JA MILITARY COMPOUND OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	
UCP C 12A	JARCISTA (CN 001 237) STONE WALL, MILITARY PATROL CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS	SEASONAL PATROLS DUE TO SNOW
BCP C 13	VRBANJ (BN 952 150) NO BUSES AND LORRIES, OPEN 0600-1900 POLICE/MILITARY/CUSTOMS MONTENEGRIN VILLAGES BEYOND BCP METAL SAW HORSES	24 HOURS 2 CARAVANS CAPSAT SATPHONE
(JA 09	KAMENO (BN 972 057) JA MILITARY COMPOUND OBSERVING AND PATROLLING)	